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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the effect of incorrect
disk replacement service on the availability of data storage
systems. To this end, we first conduct Monte Carlo simulations
to evaluate the availability of disk subsystem by considering
disk failures and incorrect disk replacement service. We also
propose a Markov model that corroborates the Monte Carlo
simulation results. We further extend the proposed model to
consider the effect of automatic disk fail-over policy. The results
obtained by the proposed model show that overlooking the impact
of incorrect disk replacement can result up to three orders of
magnitude unavailability underestimation. Moreover, this study
suggests that by considering the effect of human errors, the
conventional believes about the dependability of different RAID
mechanisms should be revised. The results show that in the
presence of human errors, RAID1 can result in lower availability
compared to RAID5.
I. INTRODUCTION
Human errors have significant impact on the availability of
Information systems [1], [2], [3] where some field studies
have reported that 19% of system failures are caused by human
errors [4], [3]. In large data-centers with Exa-Byte (EB) storage
capacity (by employing more than one million disk drives),
one should expect at least a disk failure per hour. Despite
using mechanisms such as automatic fail-over in modern data-
centers, in many cases the role of human agents is inevitable.
Meantime, the probability of human error, even by using
precautionary mechanisms such as checklists and employing
high-educated and high-trained human resources, is between
0.1 and 0.001 [5], [6], [7], [8]. Such statistics translate that
an exascale data-center will face multiple human errors a day.
Disk drives are of most vulnerable components in a Data
Storage System (DSS). Disk failures and Latent Sector Errors
(LSEs) [9] are of main sources of data loss in a disk
subsystem. Several studies have tried to investigate the effect
of these two incidences on a single disk and disk array
reliability [9], [10], [11], [12]. In particular, the failure root
cause breakdown in previous studies [4], [3] shows that human
error is of great importance.
In this paper, we propose an availability model for the disk
subsystem of a Backed-up data storage system1 by consider-
ing the effect of disk failures and human errors. While the
incorrect repair service can have many different roots and
happen in many different conditions, in this work we just
consider the incorrect disk replacement service and call it
1An storage system that keeps an updated backup of data, for example on
a tape. In such system, we assume that data loss can be recovered using the
backup and has just an unavailability consequence.
Wrong Disk Replacement. In our analysis, both disk subsys-
tems with and without automatic disk fail-over are considered.
The proposed analytical technique is based on Markov models
and hence requires the assumption of exponential distributions
for time-to-failure and time-to-restore. Furthermore, to cope
with other probability distribution functions such as Weibull,
that describes the disk failure behavior in a more realistic
manner [12], we have developed a model based on Monte-
Carlo (MC) simulations. This model has also been used as a
reference to validate the proposed Markov model when using
exponential distributions.
By incorporating the impact of human errors on the avail-
ability of disk subsystem, several important observations are
obtained. First, it is shown that overlooking the impact of
incorrect repair service will result in a considerable under-
estimation (up to 263X) of the system downtime. Second, it
is observed that in the presence of human errors, conventional
assumptions on the availability ranking of different Redundant
Array of Independent Disks (RAID) configurations can be
contradicted. Third, it is demonstrated that automatic disk fail-
over can significantly improve the overall system availability
when on-line rebuild is provided by using spare disks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II represents a background on human errors. Sec-
tion III elaborates the Monte-Carlo simulation-based model.
Section IV presents the proposed Markov models, considering
the impact of human errors. Section V provides simulation
results and the corresponding findings. Lastly, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Human Error in Safety-Critical Applications
To better understand and quantify human errors in a non-
benign system, the Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) [13]
techniques have been developed where its major focus is the
quantification of Human Error Probability (hep) which is
simply defined by the fraction of error cases observed, over the
opportunities for human errors [6]. By collecting hep values
obtained by NASA, EUROCONTROL, and NUREG, we found
that human error has usually a probability in the range of
0.001 to 0.1 depending on the application and situation. This
probability mainly varies from 0.001 up to 0.01 in enterprise
and safety-critical applications [6], [7], [8], [5].
B. Human Errors in Data Storage Systems
While human errors in data storage systems can happen
in very different situations, in this work we focus on one of
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Fig. 4: An Example: MC Simulation to Calculate Availability of a RAID5 3+1 Array in
Presence of Human Errors (rebuild time = 10h)
6.1. Proposed Simulation-Based Availability Model in Presence of Human Errors
One of the most common reported errors by field engineers is wrong disk replacement
[Haubert, 2004]. When a disk fails in a RAID array (e.g., a RAID5 array), the array
continues to operate in the exposed state. Upon detection of the failed disk, a techni-
cian needs to replace it by a spare disk and run a script (or a command) to start the
recovery process by reconstructing the failed disk data from other operational disks.
During the recovery process, the technician is supposed to follow a predefined proce-
dure. Any mistake by the technician during the recovery process such as a wrong disk
replacement or running a wrong script can significantly affect the availability of the
disk subsystem. For example, in a RAID5 array, a wrong disk replacement or execut-
ing a wrong script before the completion of the recovery process can make the array
unavailable. Therefore, in addition to double disk failures which can make the array
unavailable, a human error such as a wrong disk replacement right after a disk failure
can also significantly affect the overall system availability.
In order to investigate the impact of human errors on the availability of disk sub-
systems, we extend our proposed simulation-based availability model as follows. First,
the disk failure events are generated according to the desired failure distribution (ex-
ponential, Weibull, etc). Next, the expected completion time of each recovery process
is extracted considering the repair distribution and repair rate. Lastly, human er-
ror events are generated considering human error probability along with each failure
events. After generation of failure, recovery, and human error events, we start travers-
ing all events in sequence.
Fig. 4 shows an example which illustrates how a wrong disk replacement can make
a RAID5 array unavailable. In this example, in addition to data loss events due to
double disk failures at times 407h and 893h, two wrong disk replacements lead to two
Data Unavailability (DU ) events at times 326h and 648h. Note that both data loss
and data unavailability events will impose downtime to the storage system. Similar
to the reference model described in Section 5, Equation 2 can be used to calculate the
availability of the disk subsystem using MC simulations in the presence of human
errors.
6.2. Proposed Markov Model of RAID5 Configuration in Presence of Human Errors
Considering an exponential distribution for both failure and repair rates, we further
extend the previous Markov model presented in Section 3 (Fig. 2(a)) considering the
effect of human errors on the availability of disk subsystems. The proposed Markov
ACM Transactions on Storage, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Fig. 1: MC Simulation to Calculate Availability of a RAID5
3+1 Array in Presence of Human Errors (rebuild time = 10h)
the most prevalent samples, the wrong disk replacement. In a
RAID array, given RAID5, with no disk spare, the disk fail-
over proc ss can star after replacing the failed disk with a
brand-new disk. Consider the case that the operator replaces
the brand-new disk with one of the operating disks, rather
th n the failed one. In this cas , two disks are inaccessible
(the failed disk and the operating, wrongly removed disk),
making the entire data unavailable. However, detecting the
human error a d undoing the wrong disk pl cement makes
the array available at no data loss cost.
In the next section, we describe a simulation-based reference
model to eval ate the availability of data storage systems
considering disk failures and the effect f human errors
happening in disk replacement process.
III. AVAILABILITY OF A BACKED-UP DISK SUBSYSTEM BY
MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION
In the MC model, the failure and repair events are generated
by assuming the desired di tributions such as Weibull and
exponential. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of the MC simulation
for a RAID5 (3+1) array. In case two consecutive disk failures
happen in the same array and the second failure is before
the recovery of the first failure, a data loss event happens (as
shown in Fig. 1). As we assume that the data storage system is
backed-up, we consider the data loss event as data unavailabil-
ity, which duration is the data loss recovery (tape recovery in
our example) time. In the case of single disk failure, the failed
disk is replaced by a human agent. However, the occurrence of
a human error in the disk replacement process makes another
working disk unavailable, resulting in the unavailability of the
entire data array (in the case of RAID5), which duration varies
by the human error recovery time. The overall availability of
the disk subsystem is calculated by dividing the total disk
subsystem uptime by the overall simulation time. The error of
MC simulations is inversely proportional to the root square
of the number of iterations and the t-student coefficient for a
target confidence level [14].
IV. AVAILABILITY OF A BACKED-UP DISK SUBSYSTEM
USING MARKOV MODEL
In this section, we propose a Markov Model for a backed-up
disk subsystem availability that corroborates the Monte Carlo
reference model by assuming an exponential distribution for
both failure and repair rates. Finally, we extend the Markov
model for a disk subsystem with automatic fail-over.
OP EXP
DF
DL
DDF
DU
DF+hehep×µDF
n×λ (n-1)×λ
(1-hep)×µDF
(1-hep)×µhe
R4
R3
R2R1
R1=1-(n×λ)    R2=1-[(n-1)×λ+µ1]    R3= 1-[(1-hep)×µ3] R4= 1-[(1-hep)×µ2]
λCrash
µDDFhep: Human Error Prob.
λ: Disk Failure Rate
λCrash: Rate of Disk Crash after Human Error
µhe: Human Error Recovery Rate
µDF: Disk Failure Recovery Rate
µDDF: Double Disk Failure Recovery Rate
n: No. of Disks
Fig 5- Fig. 2: Markov Model for RAID5 Availability
A. Markov Model of RAID5 in Presence of Human Errors
Fig. 2 shows the proposed Markov model for the availability
of a backed-up disk subsystem by considering the effect of
disk failures and human errors. In this model, disk failure
rate, disk repair rate, double disk failure recovery rate from
primary backup, and Human Error Probability are shown by
λ, µDF , µDDF , and hep, respectively. Upon the occurrence
of the first disk failure, the system state will move from the
operational (OP ) to the exposed state (EXP ). While being
in the exposed state, a second disk failure will lead to a Data
Loss (DL) event while a human error during disk replacement
will lead to a Data Unavailability (DU) event. If the human
agent successfully replaces the failed disk, the array returns to
the OP state.
When the array is in the DU state, the incidence of human
errors during the fail-over process makes the array to stay in
the DU state. Otherwise, if no human error happens in the
fail-over process, the array state transits to the OP state. In
the DU state, if the wrongly replaced disk is crashed, the array
switches to DL. Finally, when the array is in the DL state, it
can be recovered by the rate of µDDF .
B. Markov Model of RAID5 With Automatic Fail-over
Here, we study the effect of automatic disk fail-over when
on-line rebuild process is being performed using hot-spare
disks. In the conventional disk replacement policy, a failed
disk may be replaced by a new disk before the completion of
the on-line rebuild process. In the automatic fail-over policy
as opposed to the conventional disk replacement policy, the
replacement process should be started after the completion
of on-line rebuild process. In automatic fail-over policy, it is
assumed that a hot spare disk is available within the array
while the system is in the operational state.
Fig. 3 shows the Markov model of a RAID5 array employ-
ing the automatic fail-over policy. The system is in the OP
state when all disks work properly and a spare disk is present.
In the case of a disk failure, the array state switches to EXP1.
In the EXP1 state, the system goes to either the DL state
by another disk failure or the OPns state if the failed disk is
rebuilt into the available spare disk. In the OPns state, all disks
of the array work properly but no spare is present. Automatic
fail-over paradigm forbids the operator to replace the affected
disk before the completion of on-line rebuild process. Hence,
disk replacement can be performed at the states other than
the EXP1 state and there is no possibility of human error in
the EXP1 state. When the system is in the OPns state, a disk
failure switches the system state to EXPns1. If the failed disk
is successfully replaced by the new disk, the array returns to
the OP state. Otherwise, if a human error happens in the disk
replacement process, the array switches to EXPns2.
Fig 8 OP
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(1-hep)×µhe
hep×µhe
2×λCrash
R6
µDF: Disk Failure Recov. Rate
µDDF: Double Disk Failure Recov. Rate
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λCrash: Rate of Disk Crash after Human Error
Fig. 3: Markov Model of RAID5 Availability with Automatic
Fail-over
In the EXPns1 state, the array has a failed disk and no
spare. In this state, successful disk fail-over process changes
the array state to OPns. Upon the successful replacement of
failed disk in the EXPns1 state, the array switches to EXP1.
However, by happening a human error in the process of disk
fail-over or in the process of failed disk replacement, the array
switches to DUns1. Upon a disk failure when the array is in
the EXPns1 state, the array switches to DLns.
In the EXPns2 state, one of the operational disks is
wrongly replaced by the new disk due to human error. To
remove this error, the wrongly removed disk should be placed
back and in return, the failed disk should be removed. If
this process happens successfully, the array goes back to OP .
Otherwise, if another human error happens in the process of
recovering the human error, the array switches to DUns2. In
the EXPns2 state, if the wrongly removed disk crashes, the
array switches to EXPns1. Happening a disk failure when the
array is in the EXPns2 state switches the array to DUns1.
In the DL state, the user data is totally lost due to a Double
Disk Failure (DDF) and a hot spare disk is available. In this
case, DDF could be recovered by the rate of µDDF . Similarly
in the DLns state, the user data is totally lost due to a DDF
but no spare is available. Here, recovery from DDF changes
the array state to OPns. In the DLns state, if one of the failed
disks is successfully replaced by the new spare disk, the array
switches to the DL state.
In the DUns1 state, the array is totally unavailable due to
a disk failure and a human error. In this state, the successful
recovery of human error changes the array state to EXPns1.
However, if the wrongly removed disk crashes, the array
switches to DLns. In the DUns1 state, performing the disk
fail-over by using the disk array is not possible as the user data
is unavailable due to the human error. In this case, performing
the disk fail-over before recovering the human error is similar
to the case of recovering DDF by the rate of µDDF . In the
DUns1 state, if the failed disk is successfully replaced by the
new spare disk, the array switches to the DU1 state.
In the DUns2 state, the array data is totally unavailable
due to the occurrence of two human errors. In this case, the
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array can switch to EXPns2 if one of the human errors
is successfully recovered. However, if one of the wrongly
removed disks crashes, the array switches to DUns1.
EXP2 is similar to EXPns2 except the point that the hot
spare disk is available in this state. Similarly, the DU1 and
DU2 states are similar to DUns1 and DUns2, respectively,
except the point that the hot spare disk is available in DU1
and DU2.
Comparing the Markov model of a RAID5 array employing
the automatic fail-over (Fig. 3) and a RAID5 array using
the conventional disk replacement policy (Fig. 2) shows a
longer path from OP to DU state when the automatic fail-
over is performed in the system. Hence, it can be realized
that the probability of being in the DU state significantly
decreases by using the automatic fail-over policy. Detailed
numerical results of this model and comparison with a RAID
array employing the conventional replacement policy will be
presented in Section V-D.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Validation of Markov Model with Simulation-Based Model
Fig. 4 shows the comparison of the proposed MC simulation
results (for 106 iterations and 99% confidence level) and the
availability values obtained by the Markov model. As shown
in this figure, the availability values obtained by the Markov
model are within the error interval of the results obtained by
the MC simulations for both hep = 0.001 and hep = 0.01.
B. Availability Estimation in Presence of Human Error
Fig. 5 reports the availability results of a RAID5 3+1 array
in the presence of human errors for different disk failure rates.
The availability of the disk subsystem has been reported for
the traditional availability model (assuming hep=0) as well
as two different human error probabilities (hep = 0.001 and
hep = 0.01). We consider typical values for the repair rate
in our experiments. In particular, we consider 0.1 and 0.03
values for µDF and µDDF , respectively. We also consider
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Fig. 6: Comparison of Availability of RAID Configurations
with Equivalent Usable Capacity and Exponential Disk Failure
µs = 1, µhe = 1, and λcrash = 0.01. Considering a constant
failure rate (for example, λ = 10−6), it is observed that the
availability of a disk subsystem is inversely proportional with
human error probability. As the results show, with the human
error probability equal to 0.001, the availability of the disk
subsystem drops between one to two orders of magnitude.
C. Availability Comparison of RAID Configurations with
Equivalent Usable Capacity
Fig. 6 compares the availability of three different RAID
configurations including R5(3+1), R5(7+1), and R1(1+1)
with equivalent usable (logical) capacity, in the presence of
human errors (hep=0, hep=0.001, and hep=0.01), assuming
exponential failure distribution (λ = 10−5). Comparing the
three RAID configurations by assuming no human errors
(hep = 0) shows that RAID1(1 + 1) results in a higher
availability compared to RAID5(3 + 1) and RAID5(7 + 1).
However, by considering hep = 0.001, the availability of all
RAID configurations dramatically decrease, while our results
show a more significant decrease in the RAID1(1 + 1)
configuration, making its availability slightly lower than both
RAID5(3+1) and RAID5(7+1) configurations. This can be
described by the higher Effective Replication Factor2 (ERF)
of RAID1(1 + 1) (ERF = 2) compared to RAID5(3 + 1)
(ERF = 1.33) and RAID5(7 + 1) (ERF = 1.14), which
mandates employing higher number of disks for a specific
usable capacity, increasing the chance of disk failure and
consequently, human errors. By considering higher hep values
(e.g., 0.01), we observe more gap between RAID configura-
tions where both RAID1(1 + 1) and RAID5(5 + 1) show
lower availability compared to RAID5(7+1), that can again
be described by the lower ERF of RAID5(7 + 1).
D. Effect of Automatic Disk Fail-over Policy
In this section, we report the effect of the automatic fail-over
policy when on-line rebuild process is being performed using
hot-spare disks. Fig. 7 compares the availability of two RAID5
arrays, performing conventional and automatic fail-over in the
presence of human errors. As the results show, using automatic
fail-over policy can significantly moderate the effect of human
errors. For example, assuming hep = 0.01, automatic fail-over
increases the system availability by two orders of magnitude
as compared to the conventional disk replacement policy. The
results reported in Fig. 7 also demonstrate that the delayed
replacement policy shows higher availability improvement
when hep has greater values.
2The ratio of storage physical size to the logical (usable) size [15].
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we investigated the effect of incorrect disk
replacement service on the availability of a backed-up disk
subsystem by using Monte Carlo simulations and Markov
models. By taking the effect of incorrect disk replacement
service into account, it is shown that a small percentage of
human errors (e.g., hep = 0.001) can increase the system
unavailability by more than one order of magnitude. Using
the proposed models, it is also shown that in some cases the
dependability ranking of RAID configurations is not as con-
ventional. Additionally, it is shown that automatic fail-over can
increase the system availability by two orders of magnitude.
Such observations can be used by both designers and system
administrators to enhance the overall system availability.
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